Kepemilikan Manajerial dan Kepemilikan Institusional Terhadap Kebijakan Leverage Melalui Pendekatan Kesempatan Bertumbuh Dan Risiko Perusahaan

Abstract

The main purpose of company was to increase company's value through increased prosperity of owner or shareholders. However, the management often had other objectives that caused conflicts of interest between management and shareholders of the company, in which the conflict was referred to as Agency Problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To minimize the differences between the interests of owners and managers, the owner could give shares to managers or increased stock ownership by institutional in order to monitor managers. If the Owner of the company wanted to reduce agency conflicts by increasing managerial ownership and institutional ownership, they will affect corporate leverage policy because managerial ownership and institutional ownership could reduce the financial risk that occurred from leverage. This study aimed to analyze the effect of managerial ownership and institutional ownership on leverage policy. This study used the entire population of companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Sampling was purposive sampling, and analytical techniques used was ordinary least squares. The control variable were structure of assets, return on assets, financial distress, asset utilization, asset growth. Furthermore, this paper considered growth opportunities and risks of the company. This study found that managers considered risk factors more than growth opportunities, and the institutional shareholders considered growth opportunities more than company risk